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CHAPTER 24 
Rule 15: Pretrial Oral 
Discovery in Massachusetts 
FRANCIS J. LARKIN and JAMES W. SMITH 
§24.1. Background and applicability of Rule 15. It may well be 
argued that the most significant development in the entire spectrum 
of Massachusetts law during the 1966 SURVEY year was the promulga-
tion by the Supreme Judicial Court of the new Rule 15 of its General 
Rules. This rule, made effective April 1, 1966, provides for oral deposi-
tions and other significant discovery procedures. The rule was quickly 
hailed as a "Landmark in Massachusetts Procedure."! It merits this 
description not only for the conspicuous substantive changes which it 
effects in Massachusetts pretrial discovery practice but also because it 
marked a virtually unprecedented dynamic exercise of the Supreme 
Judicial Court's rule-making power. The vigor of the Court's invoca-
tion of this power was made more manifest in the light of a rejection 
of pretrial oral discovery by the Massachusetts legislature less than 
two years earlier.2 The Court's action ignited a wave of legislative 
responses which expired without forcing the type of confrontation 
FRANCIS J. LARKIN is Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Boston 
College School of Law. JAMES W. SMITH is Professor of Law, Boston College 
School of Law. 
§24.l. 1 See Facher, Rule 15 - Landmark in Massachusetts History, 51 Mass. 
L.Q. 5 (1966). 
2 For an account of the acerbic struggle which preceded the legislative demise 
of the pretrial discovery proposal in 1964, see 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §21.1. 
3 The following represents a brief conspectus of the 1966 legislative response trig-
gered by the Court's action on the oral discovery issue. 
1. House No. 3343 (1966) sought absolutely to nullify and prohibit any rule on 
oral discovery. This bill, in effect, received an adverse report by the Judiciary 
Committee by virtue of the fact that no committee report was ever filed again, 
(see Joint Rule 10), despite the fact that extensive hearings were held on May 31 
and June 15. The bill was again recommitted to the Judiciary Committee on June 
20. However, no further action on this bill was thereafter taken. 
2. House No. 3592 (1966) sought to change Rule 15 by raising the requisite 
minimum ad damnum to $10,000 and, more significantly, to limit deponents to 
"parties" alone. This bill was reported favorably in the House on May 10 by the 
Judiciary Committee. However, a point of order on the ground that the redraft 
was beyond the scope of the original petition was sustained, and the bill was laid 
aside. A proposal embodying similar subject matter was later recommitted to the 
Judiciary Committee on May 12. Moreover, on May 12, a duplicate of House No. 
3592 was also substituted in the House for a portion of the 1965 Judicial Council 
Report dealing with oral discovery. On May 16, this bill was ordered to a third 
1
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between the legislature and the judiciary which has fortunately been 
avoided in this country with but few exceptions. The exceedingly 
interesting and elusive question of the nature and scope of the judicial 
rule-making power- particularly in the context of a clash with the 
legislative power ostensibly operating in the identical area - must be 
left for another time.4 This article will examine the substantive and 
procedural provisions of the rule, together with a consideration of 
some of the problems, practical as well as legal, which are likely to 
arise in its implementation. 
Rule 15 has its origins in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
particularly in a combination of Rules 26, 28-30, 32, 34, 35 and 37.5 
reading; on July 11, it was recommitted to the Judiciary Committee. On July 27, 
the duplicate of House No. 3592 was reported out favorably as House No. 3906. 
However, the Senate took no action on this proposal. 
3. House No. 3906 (1966) was a redraft based on House Nos. 3592 and 2463 
(1966) and embodied a caustically worded petition concerning the Supreme 
Judicial Court's rule-making power. The bill was reported favorably in the House 
by the Judiciary Committee on July 27. On July 28, it was ordered to a third 
reading. On August 16 an order was adopted in the House requesting an opinion 
from the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court as to the bill's constitutionality. 
This order never received final concurrence in the Senate. 
4. House No. 4016 (1966) was substituted for House No. 3906 on August 30; 
it was an order authorizing the Judiciary Committee to sit during the recess of 
the General Court to study the matter of oral discovery. The order was referred 
to the Joint Rules Committee on August 30. That committee issued no report, 
and no further action was taken. 
4 There is no dearth of literature on the subject of rule-making. Indeed, "the 
flood of rule-making literature is so great that citation is currently to bibliog-
raphies." See 6th Ann. Rep. to Supreme Judicial Court by its Executive Secretary, 
pp. 9-10. 
5 The following are the parallel references to the Federal Rules: 
~~~~~ ~&~~ 
1 (a) 26(a) 
l(b) 26(b) 
1 (c) 26(c) 
I (d) 26(d) 
1 (e) 26(e) 
I (f) 26(f) 
2(a) 28(a) 
2(b) 28(b) 
2(c) 28(c) 
3 ~ 
4(a) 30(a) 
4(b) 30(b) 
4(c) 30(c) 
~~ ~~ 
4(e) 30(e) 
4(f) 30(f) 
4(g) 30(g) 
4(h) No counterpart 
5 U 
6 M 
7(a) 35(a) 
2
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The latter deal broadly with pretrial oral discovery, the production 
and inspection of documents and the physical and mental examination 
of parties. To a lesser extent, Rule 15 is derived from the modifications 
of the Federal Rules which already exist in Maine, New Jersey, Iowa, 
and Rhode Island. Of course, until a body of Massachusetts decisional 
precedent arises, federal interpretations of its own rules will continue 
to be highly persuasive for Massachusetts lawyers and judges seeking 
guidance in this area.6 
Before turning to a section by section analysis of the provisions of 
Rule 15, its operating philosophy should be emphasized. The basic 
philosophy of the rule -like its federal precursor - is that there 
should be broad discovery as to facts and documents prior to trial in 
order to make the trial more efficient. The central theme of the dis-
covery practice is that the right to take statements and the right to 
use them in court must be kept entirely distinct. Accordingly, discovery 
Parallel References - Cant. 
Rule 15, Section No. 
7(b) 
8(a) 
8(b) 
8(c) 
8(d) 
9 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 
35(b) 
37(a) 
37(b) 
37(d) 
37(f) 
No counterpart 
6 This reliance has been frequently recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. As Commissioner of Banks v. Prudential Trust Co., 242 Mass. 78, 
84, 136 N.E. 410, 412 (1922), points out: "It is an established rule that the adjudged 
interpretation of the words of a statute by the courts of the jurisdiction where 
it was enacted is intended to be adopted when afterwards the same statute is 
passed by the Legislature of another State or country. Courts of the latter State 
or country commonly feel constrained to give the statute the same constructions 
as that earlier given it by the courts of the State or country first enacting it, in the 
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary." 
There is a wealth of excellent source materials on the Federal Rules, both in 
encyclopedia and digest form. Wright, Federal Courts 308-347 (1963), provides an 
excellent hornbook analysis of the discovery sections of the Federal Rules; 2A 
Barron & RoltlOff, Federal Practice and Procedure (rev. ed. 1961), and 4 Moore, 
Federal Practice (2d ed. 1966), both contain an entire volume of detailed analysis 
dealing with the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules. Other rich sources of 
expositive material would include: Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475 (1959); Roltzoff, Origin and Sources of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1057 (1955); Knepper, Some 
Aspects of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 
228 (1956); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. 
Rev. 480 (1958); Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Docu-
ments and the Work Product of the Lawyer, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 498 (1958); Note, 
Federal Courts: Evidence: State Privilege Rules Applicable in Diversity Actions: 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), 44 Calif. L. Rev. 949 (1956); Note, Federal 
Procedure: Due Process Limitations on Discovery Sanctions, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 836 
(1958); Note, Objection to Interrogatories Submitted with Answers Reld to Consti-
tute Waiver Under Rule 36, 6 Utah L. Rev. 429 (1959), discussing Cardox Corp. 
v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 23 F.R.D. 27 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Note, Physical 
Examination of Non-Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Iowa 
L. Rev. 375 (1957). 
• 
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at the pretrial stage is not fettered by the rules on admissibility which 
apply at a trial; at this early stage, the utmost freedom is allowed. 
Contrary to prior practice, Rule 15 proceeds on the premise that the 
right of recourse to litigation before a jury should be preserved but 
the courtroom should not be the place for the formulation of issues. 
Rather, a trial should be essentially concerned with the litigation of 
issues that have already been formulated through appropriate dis-
covery procedures. To this end, the rule contemplates that no one 
should be exempt from examination and that the widest latitude of 
pretrial examination should be encouraged in order to narrow issues, 
to simplify trials and to expedite settlements. "Thus, in a very real 
sense the Rule is remedial and should be liberally construed in the 
light of its broad purposes and intentions."7 
§24.2. Depositions pending trial. Section 1 of Rule 15 deals prin-
cipally with such matters as the taking of depositions with or without 
leave of court, the scope of examination permitted in the deposition 
proceeding and the permissible use of depositions at the trial. It is by 
far the broadest section of Rule 15. 
a. When depositions may be taken. Section I(a) of Rule 15 pro-
vides that any party to an original civil proceeding pending in the 
Supreme Judicial Court, or to a civil proceeding pending in the 
Superior Court, Land Court, or Probate Court, may take oral deposi-
tions of any person l including a party.2 The attendance of witnesses 
may be compelled by the use of a summons or subpoena.s Oral deposi-
tions may be taken as a matter of right without the necessity of obtain-
ing leave of court in all cases except the following: 
1. If notice of the taking of a deposition is served by the plaintiff 
prior to the time allowed the defendant for appearance in court;4 
7 See Facher, Rule - Landmark in Massachusetts History, 51 Mass. L.Q. 5, 6 
(1966). In this regard, courts and counsel might profit from the brief comment 
by Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 205, 
71 Sup. Ct. 209, 215, 95 L. Ed. 207, 214 (1950): "It does no good to have liberalizing 
rules like 6O(b) if, after they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's 
resort to ancient common-law concepts." 
§24.2. 1 While §1 does not specifically so state, it appears reasonably clear that 
"any person" includes the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Section 8, which 
imposes sanctions for failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 15, provides 
in subsection (d) that expenses and attorneys' fees are not to be imposed upon the 
Commonwealth for such failure, and buttresses the conclusion that the Common-
wealth is a "person" within the rule. 
2 The breadth of this provision might be contrasted with the statutory limitations 
imposed on the filing of written interrogatories, G. L., c. 231, §61. Unlike the latter 
which provides a right to only 30 questions, §1(a) of Rule 15 imposes no limit on 
the number of questions which may be asked. Furthermore, under the statute 
permitting interrogatories, questions may be directed only to an "adverse party," 
whereas under §1(a) "any person" may be deposed. 
S Rule 15, §§I(a) and 4(a). The deposition of a person confined in prison may 
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. Id. §l(a). 
4 Since this requirement of obtaining leave of court for the taking of a deposition 
when the giving of notice occurs prior to the time allowed to the defendant for 
appearance runs only to the plaintiff, the defendant, in effect, is given the first 
4
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2. In an action at law where there is no reasonable likelihood that 
recovery will exceed $5000 if the plaintiff prevails;5 
3. In a creditor's bill in equity when the claim does not exceed 
$5000; 
4. In an action at law where there has been a trial in a district court 
before transfer; 
5. In an action at law where there has been a hearing before an 
auditor; 
6. In proceedings for custody of minor children, divorce, annul-
ment, separate support, or like proceedings. 
b. The scope of examination. Rule 15 makes the distinction be-
tween the discovery of facts prior to trial and the admissibility of evi-
dence at the trial itself. Thus, except for privileged matters, it is not 
a ground for objection that the testimony sought during deposition 
would be inadmissible at the trial if such testimony appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.6 Specifically, 
opportunity to obtain discovery. This will be true if Massachusetts follows the 
federal decisions interpreting the comparable Rule 26(a) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. Note, 
however, that the federal decisions have taken the position that leave of court 
to the plaintiff to give notice of the taking of depositions prior to the time the 
defendant must appear will be granted only upon a showing of unusual circum-
stances or conditions which will be likely to prejudice him if he is compelled to 
wait the required time. Brause v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956); Babolia v. Local 456, Teamsters & Chauffers Union, 11 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951). But d. Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949). Furthermore, federal cases have held that discovery under the 
federal rules shall be given in the order demanded. Shulman, Inc. v. Shertz, 18 
F.R.D. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1955). This rule relates to discovery of any kind. Technical 
Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
See Facher, Rule 15, Landmark in Massachusetts Procedure, 51 Mass. L.Q. 5, 8-9 
(1966). Thus by being able to be the first to give notice of discovery, the defendant 
may be able to complete all of his discovery before the plaintiff is able to com-
mence his discovery. Where, however, such priority would be oppressive, considera-
tion should be given to the language in the last sentence of Section 4(a) of Rule 15: 
"The court may regulate at its discretion the time, place and order of taking 
depositions as shall best serve the convenience Of the parties and witnesses and the 
interests of justice." (Emphasis supplied.) 
5 In determining whether no reasonable likelihood exists that the damages will 
exceed $5000 if the plaintiff prevails, little weight should be given to the ad 
damnum in the writ. Otherwise, in a close case the plaintiff could attempt to 
avoid discovery by claiming under the $5000 amount or attempt to obtain dis· 
covery by claiming over $5000. Of greater significance than the ad damnum of 
the writ would be the statement which the plaintiff must file under Rule 33A of 
the Rules of the Superior Court setting out the facts in full detail upon which he 
relies as constituting his damages. 
It should be emphasized that a finding by the court that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the damages will exceed $5000 if the plaintiff prevails, has ~he 
effect of denying the party seeking to take depositions under Rule 15 the oppor· 
tunity of obtaining such discovery as a matter of right. The court may nevertheless 
still grant the right to take depositions under Rule 15. 
6 Rule 15, §l(b). The approach of §1(b) follows the concept of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(b). See Wright, Federal Courts 308 (1963). 
This approach might be contrasted with the approach under our written inter· 
rogatories statute, G.L., c. 231, §61 which limits discovery of facts and documents 
to those which would be admissible in evidence at the trial of the case. 
5
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the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not priv-
ileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending proceeding, whether it relates to the claim or defense of 
the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition 
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of 
relevant facts.7 
There are of course certain exceptions to the wide scope of dis-
covery, permitted under Section l(b) of Rule 15. As mentioned previ-
ously, discovery may not be had of matters which are privileged.8 
Secondly, the court is granted wide discretion under Rule 15, upon 
motion by the party or other persons to be examined and upon notice 
and a showing of good cause, to limit the scope of examination. 
Finally, Section l(b) provides either absolute or qualified immunity 
with respect to the production of certain documents or other items.9 
The procedure for examination and cross-examination of deponents 
can be the same as at trial in the court in which the proceeding is 
pending. 10 
c. Permissible use of depositions at the trial. The use of deposi-
tions taken under Rule 15 is, of course, not limited to discovery pur-
poses. In certain defined instances, such depositions may be used at 
the trial.H The deposition of a party to the action may be used at the 
trial by the adverse party for any purpose.12 The deposition of a wit-
ness who is not a party to the action may be used for the purpose of 
impeaching or contradicting the testimony of such witness.13 It may 
also be used as independent evidence in the following instances: 
1. if the witness is dead; 
2. if the witness is out of state, unless it appears that the absence of 
the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; 
3. if the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sick-
ness, infirmity, or imprisonment; 
4. if the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure 
the attendance of the witness by subpoena; 
7 Rule 15, §l(b). This approach might be contrasted with our written interrog-
atories statute, G.L., c. 231, §§61, 63, which provides that a party need not disclose 
the names of witnesses unless the court otherwise orders such disclosure. 
8 A complete discussion of this absolute or qualified privilege is contained in the 
treatment of §6 of Rule 15, §24.7 infra. 
9 Rule 15, §4(b). A more complete discussion of this matter appears in the textual 
treatment of §4 of Rule 15, §24.5 infra. 
10 Rule 15, §l(c). 
11 Obviously, the matter contained in the deposition which a party is attempting 
to use at the trial must be admissible under the rules of evidence. Objections may 
be made at the trial to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for 
any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were 
then present and testifying. See id. §1(e). 
12Id. §1(d)(2). The word "party" includes an officer, director or managing agent 
of a public or private corporation which is a party. 
18Id. §1(d)(I). 
6
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5. if upon application and notice that such exceptionable circum-
stances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with 
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses 
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.14 
If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an 
adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant 
to the part introduced. Any party may introduce any other part.15 
Except with respect to the deposition of an adverse party, the intro-
duction in evidence of the deposition or any part thereof for any pur-
pose other than that of contradicting or impeaching the deponent 
makes the deponent the witness of the party introducing the deposi-
tion.16 Any party may rebut any relevant evidence contained in a 
deposition whether introduced by him or by any other party,17 
§24.3. Persons before whom depositions may be taken. Section 2 
provides that within the Commonwealth depositions may be taken 
before anyone authorized by law to administer the oath or before any 
one appointed by the court.1 The appointment by the court confers 
the power to administer the oath. Section 2(b), like its counterpart, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b), provides for three alternatives 
in establishing the appropriate modus operandi under this section. For-
eign depositions may be taken (1) before a person authorized to ad-
minister the oath at the place of the depositions; (2) before a person 
commissioned by the court before which the action is pending; or 
(3) pursuant to a letter rogatory.2 
14 Id. §1(d)(3). 
15Id. §1(d)(4). 
16Id. §l(f). It should be noted that merely taking the deposition of a witness 
does not make the deponent the witness of the party taking the deposition. 
17 Ibid. 
§24.3. 1 This section should be read in conjunction with §3. See §24.4 infra. 
2 Letters rogatory are issued by a domestic court upon application after notice. 
The letters constitute a request by the domestic court that a foreign court examine 
a person within its jurisdiction. The foreign court examines the witness or appoints 
someone to do it. See generally, 4 Moore, Federal Practice §28.05 (2d ed. 1966). 
Where depositions are sought to be taken in foreign countries, there may be a 
practical problem deriving from the fact that there is no procedure for compelling 
witnesses to attend and answer questions. In this regard, Professor Moore in 4 
Federal Practice §28.07 (2d ed. 1966), suggests the following procedure for a party 
taking a deposition in a foreign country: 
1. He should ascertain from the Department of State the precise methods avail· 
able to him for taking testimony in the foreign country in question. 
2. If the notice procedure is available he should utilize it, without resorting to 
the issuance of a commission or letters rogatory. 
3. If the foreign country does not permit the taking of depositions by the notice 
procedure, but does permit the taking of testimony by commission, he must apply 
to the district court for the issuance of a commission to take testimony. 
4. If the foreign country does not permit the taking of depositions either by the 
notice procedure or by commission, he may apply to the district court for the 
issuance of letters rogatory. Similarly, he may apply to the district court for the 
issuance of letters rogatory when a witness refuses to appear or to answer upon 
the taking of a deposition by the notice procedure or by commission, if the courts 
of the foreign country will not compel the witness to appear or answer without 
the issuance of letters rogatory. And under an appropriate showing of necessity 
7
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Section 2(c) provides that no deposition shall be taken before an 
"interested" party. Under its terms, persons so disqualified include 
persons having a financial interest in the outcome of the prospective 
litigation, relatives, employees, or attorneys of any party, and persons 
associated with such disqualified attorneys. Objections under this sub-
section are deemed to be waived unless raised at the beginning of the 
deposition "or as soon thereafter as the disqualification becomes known 
or could be discovered with reasonable diligence."8 
§24.4. Stipulations regarding the taking of depositions. While 
very short, Section 3 is one of the more important sections of Rule 15. 
It provides that if the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may 
be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and 
in any manner, and when so taken may be used in the same manner as 
any other depositions. The use of Section 3 by attorneys can signifi-
cantly ease the burdens, financial and otherwise, of taking depositions 
under Rule 15. Thus, for example, the parties may stipulate to elimi-
nate the requirements under §4(e) and (f) that the officer who takes 
the deposition submit a transcript of the testimony to a witness for 
his signature, make a certification that the witness was duly sworn by 
the officer, and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony 
given by the witness, seal the transcript and file it with the court in 
which the proceeding is pending. 
§24.5. Procedures for deposition upon oral examination. Section 
4 sets forth the procedure under which the deposition process is com-
menced. It is a manifestation that the drafters contemplated the rule 
to be largely self-executing and that recourse to the courts, either to 
commence the procedure or for supervisory assistance during the de-
position process, would be a rare event. Under this section, to initiate 
the deposition process a party need only give written notice to every 
other party to the action at least seven days prior to the date set for the 
deposition,! and file a copy of the notice in court.2 In the vast majority 
or convenience, letters rogatory may be issued in the first instance, but it must 
clearly appear wherein letters rogatory are necessary or more convenient than the 
taking of depositions by the notice procedure or by commission. 
3 In one case, attorneys stipulated that a deposition could be taken before any 
one of a group of named persons. The attorney never investigated possible dis-
qualifications of this group. In fact, the individual chosen as "officer" to take the 
deposition was a secretary of one of the opposing attorneys. This defect was held 
to be waived. However, with respect to future deposition testimony, the complain-
ing party could be relieved of the stipulation if he had misgivings as to the fidelity 
with which the secretary had performed her functions. Lavarett v. Continental 
Briar Pyne Co., 25 F. Supp. 790 (E.n.N.Y. 1938). 
§24.5. 1 This provision differs slightly from Fed. R. Civ. P. lIO(a), which requires 
only that "reasonable" notice be given. 
2 This provision also deviates from the Federal Rules which establish no require-
ment that a copy of the notice be filed with the court in which the action is 
pending. This section undoubtedly sought to give a court increased control over 
the action or, at the least, insure a greater awareness of the development in the 
case. However, again, the parties could stipulate under §lI to forego the filing if this 
was deemed desirable. 
8
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of cases there will be no necessity of obtaining leave of court to take 
the deposition. 
The form of the notice will be fundamentally the same whether the 
deposition is to be taken of a party or a witness, although the manner 
in which the deposition of a party may be utilized at trial may differ 
significantly from the manner in which the deposition of a witness is 
used. Usually, the party initiating the deposition process will select 
the time and place for the deposition. In most instances, the deposi-
tion will be taken at the examining attorney's office during normal 
court hours. 
To compel the attendance of a party, the mere giving of notice, as 
under the Federal Rules, is sufficient; there is no requirement that any 
further action be taken. On the other hand, to insure the presence of 
a witness at the deposition hearing, the initiating party must serve 
him with a subpoena directing him to appear at the prescribed time 
and place.s The notice must specify the name and address of each 
person to be examined. If the name is not known, Section 4(a) pro-
vides that "general description sufficient to identify him or the particu-
lar class or group to which he belongs" will suffice.4 
As indicated above, when a corporation is a party, notice must be 
given of the taking of the deposition of an officer or managing agent. 
To charge an adversary corporation with an admission, the deposition 
must be of an officer or managing agent when the deposition is taken.5 
The determination of whether the person sought to be deposed quali-
fies as a "managing agent" will have importance in determining the 
use that can be made of the deposition at trial and in imposing sanc-
tions for either a failure to appear or a failure to testify. The issue of 
who qualifies as a "managing agent" has been an elusive one. One 
excellent opinion has set out the criteria for making this qualification 
in the following language: 
A managing agent, as distinguished from one who is merely "an 
employee," is a person invested by the corporation with general 
powers to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with 
corporate matters; he does not act "in an inferior capacity" under 
a Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 744 
(1944); Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1944). 
4 This phraseology has received a narrow construction in the federal courts. See, 
e.g., United States v. Gahagen Dredging Corp., 24 F.R.D. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where 
a notice which demanded "the appearance of an officer or employee" of a corporate 
party having knowledge of the facts of the case was found insufficient. Accord: Fay 
v. United States, 22 F.R.D. 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Compagnia di Navigazione Mavritius 
Rome v. Kulukundis, 122 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). 
5 The purpose of this rule is to avoid, to the extent feasible, the prospects of 
disgruntled former employees making damaging statements that would bind a 
former employer. However, this rule is not inflexible. In Curry v. States Marine 
Corp., 16 F.R.D. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), an individual who was master of a ship at 
the time of the accident, but only chief mate on another vessel of the same 
employer at the time of the deposition, was held properly subject to notice of the 
corporation. 
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dose supervision or direction of "superior authority." He must be 
a person who has "the interests of the corporation so dose to his 
heart that he could be depended upon to carry out his employer'S 
direction to give testimony at the demand of a party engaged in 
litigation with the employer."6 
Finally, on the question of geographic limitations, Section 4(a) con-
tains two limitations on the distance which a witness may be required 
by subpoena to travel in order to appear at a deposition. A resident of 
the Commonwealth shall not be required to travel more than 50 miles 
from his place of residence or his place of business unless the court 
orders otherwise. A nonresident cannot be compelled to travel more 
than 50 miles from the place in which he is subpoenaed unless the 
court orders that another location would be more convenient.7 
Section 4(b) sets forth various specified protective orders which the 
court may direct in order to avoid possible abuse caused by the broad 
scope of discovery provided for in Section l. Section 4(b) provides this 
protection before the examination is begun, whereas Rule 4(d) seeks 
to provide protection during the course of the examination. When 
good cause is shown, the court in which the action is pending may 
direct any of several specified orders or "any other order which justice 
requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, undue ex-
pense, embarrassment, or oppression." The first ten types of protective 
orders which are set forth under this section parallel exactly the provi-
sions of Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.s How-
6 Krauss v. Erie R.R., 16 F.R.D. 126, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). If the "managing 
agent" issue cannot be resolved at the outset of the taking of the deposition, then 
the person should be noticed as a "witness" and served with a subpoena. It will 
then be for the trial judge to determine whether the person is or is not a "manag-
ing agent" within the rule so as to permit the deposition to be used against the 
adverse part. See Atlantic Coast Insulating Co. v. United States, 34 F.R.D. 450 
(E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
7 These restrictions do not exist where a witness is being summoned to appear 
at a trial. In this event, the "summons may be served in any county" in the 
Commonwealth. See G.L., c. 233, §2. 
8 Rule 30(b) lists ten types of protective orders which a court can make prior to 
the taking of the deposition. They are listed in Mississippi Law Institute, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, 114·116 (1964), in substance as follows: 
1. That the deposition shall not be taken. In view of the general freedom of 
discovery depositions, this motion is rarely granted under the federal experience. 
It must be remembered that the right to discovery is not dependent on disclosure 
by the party seeking discovery of the facts which he kn~ws. He may have discovery 
even though he himself has refused on the ground of privilege, United States v. 
47 Bottles, 26 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.]. 1960). Moreover, it should be noted that witnesses 
cannot escape examination by claiming that they have no knowledge of any relevant 
facts, since the party seeking to take the deposition is entitled to test their lack 
of knowledge at a deposition hearing, Republic Products, Inc. v. American 
Fedn. of Musicians, 30 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
2. It may be taken at some designated place other than that stated in the notice. 
Under the Federal Rules, normally a plaintiff will be required to make himself 
available for examination in the district in which the suit was brought. However, 
the court may order that a deposition be taken at some place other than that desig-
10
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ever, Rule 15 is considerably broader than the Federal Rules and adds 
two provisions designed to alleviate the economic burden for poorer 
litigants. When a party contemplates taking a deposition outside the 
state, he may be required to pay the traveling expenses of the opposing 
party and his attorney if it can be shown that their attendance is 
reasonably necessary at the deposition proceeding. In addition, when 
that witness is under the control of the party taking the deposition, the 
court may direct that the witness should be brought into the state for 
the deposition. 
Section 4(c) sets forth the procedures for putting the deponent 
under oath and for recording the testimony. To illumine a point left 
nated in the notice, and it may order the taking at a time other than that 
designated. The plaintiff must show good cause for not adhering to the forum 
which he selected in commencing the suit. Good cause is shown if the plaintiff 
is physically or financially unable to come to the forum, Sullivan v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 7 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Hyam v. American Export Lines, Inc., 
213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954). 
J. It may be taken only on written interrogatories. Under normal circumstances, 
the party taking the deposition is entitled to choose the method by which it is to 
be conducted, and the court will not interfere with his choice, Greenberg v. Safe 
Lighting, Inc., Inertia Switch Div., 24 F.R.D. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). However, where 
the examination will be brief or simple, or there are some other good causes, the 
courts have ordered the deposition taken on written interrogatories, see 2A Barron 
&: Holtzoff, Federal Practice &: Procedure §715.1 (Wright ed. 1961). 
4. Certain matters shall not be inquired into; and 
5. The scope of the examination shall be limited to certain matters. These two 
rules of prevention are quite similar. The principle has been applied in the instance 
in which discovery was stayed until the question of jurisdiction, which was 
challenged, had been resolved. See Wright, Federal Courts §§81·90 (1963), reprinted 
in 35 F.R.D. 39, 60 (1963). Where separate issues are to be tried, discovery has 
been limited to the one issue. However, it is well to remember that such a limita-
tion could lead to wasted effort by requiring two depositions froin the same 
witness and the court would often be justified in refusing such a limitation. 
If it is contended that the depositions are intended for discovery in another 
case, such as a closely related criminal action or an action in another court, the 
scope may be limited. 
6. The examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the 
action and their officers or counsel. It is obvious that a party, or officer of a corpo-
rate party, has to be present at the deposition proceeding. 
7. The deposition shall be opened only by order of the court. This provision 
is similar to the sixth type just mentioned and means that after being sealed the 
deposition shall be opened only by order of court. Without such a protective 
order the deposition is a public document and is freely open to inspection after 
it is filed by the clerk, Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 7 F.R.D. 
341 (N.D. Cal. 1947). 
8. Secret processes, etc., need not be disclosed. Trade secrets are not under the 
coverage of privilege and disclosure could be harmful. Accordingly this rule is 
frequently invoked. 
9. Parties shall simultaneously file specified documents with the court. 
10. Any other orders which, in effect, justice requires. As under the language 
of Rule 15, this tenth provision is the only principle that would be necessary to 
entitle a court to issue a protective order. If a court may make any order which 
justice requires, this provision, of itself, gives the trial courts sufficient latitude to 
prevent any undue harassment, and to prevent unfairness to a party. 
11
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in doubt by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c), Section 4(c) pro-
vides that the cost of the stenographer and transcription shall be borne 
by the party taking the deposition, except that the court may equitably 
apportion that cost when cause is shown. This equitable apportion-
ment is again intended to prevent abuse of the discovery procedure. 
Section 4(c) sets forth the manner in which objections arising during 
deposition are to be noted. In addition, it provides for the presenta-
tion of written interrogatories to the deponent, who then will respond 
in the customary manner. 
As noted above, while Section 4(b) seeks to prevent abuse of the 
discovery procedures before the deposition is taken, Section 4(d) is 
aimed at preventing abuse during the course of taking the deposition. 
It provides that, upon the motion of any party or the deponent "that 
the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner 
as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, oppress the deponent or party," 
the court may terminate the deposition or make any other order neces-
sary to eliminate the abuse. 
Under Section 4(e), when the testimony of the deposition has been 
fully transcribed, the deponent is given the opportunity to read the 
transcript. If any change is thereafter made, a statement must be 
included showing the reasons for making the change. Thereafter, the 
deponent signs the deposition, although his refusal to sign does not 
affect the deposition's usefulness. After the transcript has been sub-
mitted to the witness, Section 4(f) requires that the officer certify it and 
either mail or deliver it to the clerk of the court in which the action 
is pending. The parties may stipulate in writing to waive these tran-
scription and filing requirements. It is the responsibility of the party 
taking the deposition to notify all other parties of the filing. Unless 
the court otherwise orders, the copy on file is open for inspection. 
Finally, any party or the deponent may obtain copies of the deposition 
upon payment of the cost of the copy. This cost would not include 
the stenographic fee nor the cost of transcription, since their payment 
is provided for in Sections 4(c) and 9. 
Section 4(g) provides that the court may assess reasonable expenses 
and attorney fees which have been incurred in two situations. The 
first is when the party giving notice of the deposition fails to attend 
and the other party or his attorney does attend. The second is when 
the party giving notice fails properly to compel the attendance of the 
prospective witness and the witness does not attend, while the other 
party or his attorney does attend. 
Section 4(h) has no equivalent under the Federal Rules. Its purpose 
is to equate an appointment for a deposition with a court engagement, 
to the extent the court in which the proceeding is pending recognizes 
the deposition. When a deposition is deemed to be such a court engage-
ment, the counsel will not be required to set up and keep any 
conflicting court appearances. In order for counsel to obtain court 
recognition of the deposition appointment, he must file an applica-
12
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tion with the court in which the proceeding is pending at least three 
days prior to the time for the taking of the deposition. 
§24.6. Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions. Situations 
will arise in the taking of depositions under Rule 15 in which one 
of the parties may wish to object. For example, procedural objections 
may be raised such as an irregularity in notice, the disqualification of 
the officer before whom the deposition is being taken, or the conduct 
of the parties. On the other hand, the objection may relate to a 
substantive matter such as the competency of a witness or the compe-
tency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony. Section 5 of Rule 15 deals 
with the question of when objection must be made to such matters in 
order to be effective. 
a. Errors or irregularities as to procedure. Generally speaking ob-
jections relating to procedure are waived unless promptly taken. More 
specifically Section 5 provides as follows: 
1. As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking 
a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served 
upon the party giving the notice.1 
2. As to disqualification of officer taking the deposition. Objection 
to taking a deposition because of disqualification of the officer before 
whom it is to be taken is waived unless made before the taking of the 
deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the disqualification becomes 
known or could be discovered with reasonable diligence.2 
3. As to taking of the deposition. Errors and irregularities occurring 
at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the 
form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the 
conduct of the parties, and errors of any kind which might be obviated, 
or cured if promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection 
is made at the taking of the deposition.3 
4. As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and irregular-
ities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposi-
tion is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, transmitted, filed, 
or otherwise dealt with by the officer are waived unless a motion to 
suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable 
promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence might have been, 
ascertained.4 
b. Errors or irregularities as to substantive matters. Section 5(c)(I) 
of Rule 15 provides that objections to the competency of a witness or 
to the "competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not 
waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the 
deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have 
been obviated or removed if presented at that time." The main diffi-
culty with this provision is the so-called "obviation clause." The pur-
§24.6. 1 Rule 15, §5(a). 
2Id. §5(b). 
3Id. §5(c). 
4Id. §5(d). 
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pose of the clause is clear. It would be rather unfair, for example, to 
permit a party at the trial to object to the competency of an expert 
witness whose deposition the other party is attempting to use as evi-
dence at the trial, where the witness is not now available and the 
matter could have been clarified at the time of the deposition. On the 
other hand, with respect to the relevancy or materiality of questions, 
difficulties certainly arise. The scope of questioning under Rule 15 is 
not limited to what is admissible at the trial but rather by whether a 
question is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.5 As a result, an attorney may find himself objecting to numer-
ous questions which in his opinion would not be admissible at the 
trial, but are proper at the deposition, in order to avoid the possibility 
that the obviation clause might be used against his trial objections if 
an attempt is made to ask the same questions, or to introduce into 
evidence the answers to the questions appearing in the deposition. 
Perhaps the best way to avoid this difficulty is to have the parties 
stipulate that no objections to the competency, relevancy, or material-
ity of a question is deemed to be waived for failure to take such 
objections at the time of the taking of the deposition.6 
§24.7. Discovery and production of documents and things for in· 
spection, copying, or photographing. Section 6 of Rule 151 has two 
parts: (1) it authorizes the inspection, copying, or photographing by 
or on behalf of the moving party of documents, papers, books, ac-
counts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, 
which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters 
within the scope of examination permitted by Section l(b)2 and which 
are in the possession, custody, or control of the other party;3 (2) it 
permits entry upon land or other property in the possession or control 
of a party4 for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, testing, 
or photographing the property or any designated object or operation 
thereon within the scope of examination permitted by Section 1(b).5 
51d. §I(b). 
6 The scope of the language of Section 3 of Rule 15 would certainly seem to 
encompass such a stipulation. 
§24.7. 1 Section 6 is taken verbatim from Rule 34 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. Hence 
the cases interpreting Rule 34 should be helpful in interpreting Section 6. 
2 It may be recalled that the general test of the scope of examination under 
§I(b) is not whether the testimony would be admissible at the trial but rather 
whether the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. There are, however, certain exceptions which are discussed 
above in the text. See §24.2 supra. 
3 For a discussion of the meaning of the word "control" used in Rule 34 of the 
Fed. R. Civ. P., see Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (1958). It is clear that a party 
cannot avoid an order under Section 6 by turning possession of an item over to 
someone else such as his attorney or insurer. Bingle v. Liggett Drug Co., 11 F.R.D. 
593 (D. Mass. 1951). 
4 If the land or other property is in the possession or control of a non-party to the 
action, §6 is inapplicable. However, a party seeking such an entry might resort to 
a bill in equity for discovery in aid of an action at law. See MacPherson v. Boston 
Edison Company, 336 Mass. 92, 142 N.E.2d 758 (1957). 
5 See note 2 supra. 
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Differences from deposition sections. Section 6 differs from the 
deposition sections in several respects. First, irrespective of the amount 
involved in the litigation, discovery under Section 6 can be obtained 
only upon the granting of a motion by the court upon a showing of 
good cause.6 Second, discovery under the section is limited to the 
parties to the action. Third, the section does not contain a provision, 
comparable to Section 1, pertaining to the courts in which discovery 
is available.7 
Scope of discovery. The general test of the scope of discovery under 
Section 6 is not whether the item would be admissible as evidence at 
the trial but whether the item sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.s There are, however, 
certain exceptions to this broad category. Discovery may not be ob-
tained of privileged matter.9 Section 6 specifically incorporates the 
protective provisions of Section 4(b). It will be recalled that this 
section deals with orders protecting parties and deponents from annoy-
ance, undue expense, embarrassment, or oppression. Of particular 
significance to the production of items under Section 6 is the follow-
ing language in Section 4(b): 
... [UJpon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which 
the proceeding is pending may make an order that certain matters 
shall not be inquired into, that secret processes, developments, or 
research need not be disclosed or that the parties shall simul-
taneously file specified documents or information enclosed in 
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
Section 6 expressly incorporates the provisions of Section I(b), which 
include the so-called "work product rule" developed in the famous 
United States Supreme Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor. 10 In the 
Hickman case the Court held that a lawyer's work product had a 
qualified immunity from discovery; such material is discoverable only 
upon a substantial showing of necessity. Section I(b) separates (I) 
writings, plans, recordings, photographs, or other things prepared 
by or for the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent 
in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trialll from (2) a 
6 A question arises as to whether ,the "good cause" requirement of §6 can be 
avoided by the use of a subpoena duces tecum, proceeding under §l(b). It is 
hardly likely that such circumvention will be allowed. See 4 Moore, Federal 
Practice §26.l0(1) (2d ed. 1963). 
7 The question thus arises as to whether §6 may be utilized in connection with 
an action in the district court. It is the authors' opinion that the answer is no. 
S A specific exception to this rule is a liability insurance policy or indemnity 
agreement. In order to obtain discovery of these items, they would have to be 
admissible in evidence at the trial. 
9 Matter is privileged if it would be privileged at the trial under the rules of 
evidence. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1953). 
10329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). 
11 Section l(b) broadened the qualified immunity of Hickman v. Taylor so as 
to m~ke it applicable not only to items prepared by an attorney but also to items 
prepared by the adverse party, his surety, indemnitor, or his agent. 
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writing which reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories or the conclusions of an expert. With 
respect to the former, the immunity is qualified. Thus a court may as 
to the items order production on the ground that a denial of produc-
tion or inspection will result in injustice or undue hardship. With 
respect to the latter, the immunity is absolute.12 
Interpretive problems. Perhaps the major problem of interpretation 
with respect to Section 6 is the meaning of the term "good cause." 
What is required to show "good cause?" The opinions of the federal 
courts have not been uniform in their interpretation. Some courts 
have taken the view that as long as the item sought is not privileged 
nor immunized under the doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor,13 good 
cause is shown by a demonstration that the item would be admissible 
evidence or would lead to admissible evidence.14 As applied to Massa-
chusetts Rule 15, the same would be true as long as the item was not 
privileged and was outside the limitations of Sections l(b) and 4(b). 
However, since the limitations of these two sections are expressly 
incorporated into Section 6, this interpretation of the latter section 
is subject to the criticism that it renders the "good cause" language 
redundant and thus violates an elementary rule of statutory construc-
tion of giving meaning to every word of a statute. 
Another interpretation of "good cause" is that it requires a showing 
of special circumstances.15 Such an interpretation does not, however, 
appear to be within the spirit of the discovery rules. Despite the fact 
that it may render the term "good cause" somewhat redundant, our 
courts will probably interpret the term in not too strict a fashion, 
perhaps requiring only that none of the limitations of Sections l(b) 
and 4(b) are present. 
Section 6 raises another problem for judicial interpretation in estab-
lishing the standards of specificity with which the movant must desig-
nate the item sought. For example, could a party merely make a 
motion for all of the documents in the control of the defendant 
pertaining to the subject matter of the litigation? Again there is a 
split in the federal cases. One case has held that the motion must be 
sufficiently specific to enable a party to go to his files and, without 
difficulty, pick out the document required.16 Another case, expressing 
12 There is one exception to this absolute immunity attaching to the conclusions 
of an expert. This is found in §7(b) dealing with the right of a party under some 
circumstances to request medical reports from the other party. This matter is 
discussed in the text, §24.8 infra. 
U 329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). 
14 Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Uncle Ben's Pancake Houses, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 506, 508 
(S.D. Tex. 1962); Park &: Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 404, 
406 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
15 See Guilford National Bank of Greensboro v. Southern Ry. Co., 297 F.2d 
921, 924·927 (4th Cir. 1962), noted in 1962 Duke L.J. 572; Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. 
&: P. R. Co., 216 F.2d 501, 505-507 (7th Cir. 1954). 
16 United States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 5!J4, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
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a more liberal view, held that it is proper to demand all the documents 
under the other party's control pertaining to the particular subject 
matter,17 Perhaps the best approach is a compromise of these extremes. 
The description should be sufficient to appraise a man of ordinary 
intelligence as to what documents are required and sufficient enough 
so that the court will be able to ascertain whether the order has been 
complied with.18 What will often happen, is that the identity of docu-
ments or other items will be ascertained at the time of the deposition. 
Then, subsequ~ntly, a motion will be made to produce such docu-
ments or items under Section 6. 
§24.8. Physical and mental examination. Under Section 7 of Rule 
15, if the mental or physical condition of a party to a proceeding is 
in controversy or may affect the conduct of the proceeding, the court 
in which the proceeding is pending may order him to submit to a 
physical or mental examination conducted by a physician. 1 If requested 
by the person examined, the party causing the examination to be made 
shall deliver a copy of the report of the examining physician, setting 
out his findings and conclusions.2 After such requests and delivery the 
party causing the examination to be made will be entitled upon re-
quest to receive from the party examined a like report of any examina-
tion,S previously or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical 
condition.4 
Differences from deposition sections. Section 7 differs from the de-
position sections in several respects. First, irrespective of the amount 
involved in the litigation, discovery under Section 7 can be obtained 
17 United States v. U.S. Alkali Exports Assn., Inc., 7 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). 
18 See United States v. National Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 607, 610 (S.D. Tex. 1960). 
See also Wright, Federal Courts §87 (1963). 
§24.8. 1 Rule 35 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., the provisions of which are comparable 
to §7 of Rule 15, does not contain the language, "or may affect the conduct of the 
proceeding. " 
2 It has been held under Rule 35 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. that the right to obtain 
a copy of the report is not lost when a party submits voluntarily to the examination. 
See Rucker v. Calmar SS. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Pa. 1960), and cases cited 
in 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §823 n.22 (Wright ed. 
1961). 
3 While the word "examination" is in the singular, it seems reasonably clear 
that it refers to all examinations relating to the same mental or physical condition. 
4 Most cases have held under Rule 35 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. that the examined 
party cannot be required to tum over his own reports where he made no request 
but had been given a copy of the examining party's report voluntarily. See Sher 
v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777, 36 A.L.R.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 
936 (1953). Since Massachusetts does not have a physician·patient privilege, Com-
monwealth v. Gordon, 307 Mass. 155, 29 N.E.2d 719 (1940), the question arises as 
to whether such medical reports could be obtained under §6 of Rule 15. Since §6 
incorporates §1(b) which excludes from discovery "conclusions of an expert," it 
would seem that discovery may be obtained under §6 only with respect to matters 
in the medical reports which are not conclusions. Currie v. Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 660 (D. Mass. 1959). 
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only upon the granting of a motion by the court upon a showing of 
good cause.5 Second, discovery under the section is limited to parties 
to the action.6 Third, Section 7 does not contain a provision compar-
able to Section I pertaining to the courts in which discovery is avail-
able. 
Scope of discovery. The first matter involving scope of discovery 
under Section 7 is the type of proceeding in which it may be utilized. 
Although the rule states "any proceeding," was it intended to apply 
only to personal injury cases? Initially, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was given this restrictive construction,7 but this was 
subsequently changed.s It is hardly likely that the Supreme Judicial 
Court would give it such a restrictive construction. 
Another matter involving the scope of discovery under Section 7, 
is the type of examination that the court will order. Will the court 
order an examination which is novel or which involves a great deal of 
pain? The type of examination allowed will no doubt depend upon 
a balancing of the pain involved with the need in the particular case 
for such an examination.9 This balancing process is probably neces-
sitated by the term "good cause." At a minimum, it would seem that 
the type of examination requested must be medically acceptable. 
Courts have ordered painful examinations under Rule 35 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the safety of the examination 
and its need in the particular case was adequately demonstrated.1O 
Finally, while unlike Section 6 of Rule 15, Section 7 does not ex-
pressly incorporate the safeguards of Section 4(b), it would appear 
that such safeguards are impliedly present in the . language, "for good 
cause shown."l1 
Problems of interpretation. As with Section 6 of Rule 15, one of the 
more significant matters for interpretation under Section 7 is the 
meaning of the term "for good cause." Since, generally speaking, the 
submission by an individual to a physical or mental examination is 
more personal and often more onerous than turning over a document 
or object to the other party, it is likely that the courts will be more 
strict in their application of the "good cause" requirement in Section 
5 For a discussion of the tenn "good cause" in connection with §7, see text 
supported by notes 9-14 infra. 
6 For a discussion of the word "party" in §7, see text supported by note 15 infra. 
7 In Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939), the court held it 
inapplicable in a libel action where the defendant was attempting to establish the 
truth of his statements about the plaintiff's physical and mental condition. 
S In Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 131 A.L.R. 804 (D.C. Cir. 1940), the court held 
the rule applicable to pennit blood tests in a divorce action on the ground of 
adultery. 
9 See Wright, Federal Courts §88 (1963). 
10 See, e.g., Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (cystoscopy 
and phylegrams); 2A Barron Be Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §822.1 
(Wright ed. 1961). 
11 While the rule does not so state, it is likely that the party examined would 
be entitled to have his own physician present during the examination. See 
Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (D. Md. 1960). 
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7 than in Section 6. The United States Supreme Court12 has recently 
pointed out that the "good cause" requirement of Rule 35 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not satisfied by mere conclusionary 
allegations in the pleadings nor by mere relevance to the case, but that 
it necessitates "an affirmative showing by the movant that each condi-
tion as to which the examination is sought is really and genuinely 
in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular 
examination."18 As mentioned previously,14 it is likely that the "good 
cause" requirement constitutes a weighing of the particular need for 
the examination against the pain and novelty of the examination. 
Finally, the word "party" as used in Section 7 of Rule 15 may re-
quire interpretation. Does it refer to named parties only or does it 
encompass a person with a substantial interest in the outcome of the 
litigation? May, for example, a defendant obtain a physical examina-
tion of a wife when her husband is suing for her injuries? While the 
courts in interpreting Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
have occasionally ordered an examination of a person who is a party 
"in substance" although not "in form,"15 the situations are rare where 
such a liberal interpretation has prevailed. 
§24.9. Consequences of refusal to make discovery. Section. 8(a) 
provides sanctions in those situations where a party or other deponent 
wrongfully refuses to answer a question. The party seeking the answer 
must then obtain a court order before the deponent can be compelled 
to answer. The court may in its discretion assess reasonable expenses 
and attorney's fees if either the questioner or the deponent acted 
"whhout substantial justification." 
Section 8(b) provides the sanction which the court may impose if 
a court order has not been complied with. A refusal to answer a 
question after a Section 8(a) order may be considered contempt of 
court. Section 8(b)(2) states that the court may make such orders as 
it deems just where a party or an officer or managing partner of a 
party has violated an order made under Section 8(a), Section 6 (discov-
ery of documents and real estate), or Section 7 (mental or physical 
examination). Section 8(b)(2) then specifies four additional sanctions 
at the disposal of the court: 
(a) an order which admits as facts, propositions which the party 
seeking the order was attempting to establish; 
(b) an order which precludes the disobedient party from introduc-
ing facts or defenses or claims contrary to those sought to be estab-
lished by the party obtaining the order; 
12 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 Sup. Ct. 234, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152 
(1964). 
13 Id. at 118, 85 Sup. Ct. at 242-243, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 164. 
14 See text supported by notes 9-10 supra. 
15 In Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940), the court ordered a blood-
grouping test for a newly born child in a separate maintenance action where the 
husband counterclaimed for divorce on the ground of adultery, on the basis that 
the child had a direct interest in the action and his interest was being represented. 
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(C) an order striking out pleading or staying the proceedings until 
the order is obeyed or awarding default judgment against the dis-
obedient party; or 
(d) an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of any party, 
except in a case involving a mental or physical examination. 
Section 8(c) provides sanctions against a party or an officer or man-
aging agent of a party who willfully· fails to appear at a deposition 
according to the notice he received. The court on motion may strike 
any part or all of his pleadings, dismiss the proceedings, or issue a 
default judgment. 
Section 8(d) provides that expenses and attorney's fees may not be 
imposed upon the Commonwealth under Section 8. It also provides 
strong if indirect evidence that the Commonwealth was intended to 
be subject to the discovery provisions. 
Section 9, which has no counterpart in the Federal Rules, provides 
that the court in its discretion may assess the costs of taking a deposi-
tion on one of the parties as part of taxable costs. The taxable costs 
include the fees of the officer and stenographer, the cost of the sum-
mons, and the costs of transcription. Section 4(c) states that the cost 
of stenographer and transcription will generally be borne by the party 
taking the deposition, except that, for cause shown, these expenses 
may be equitably apportioned. In order to reconcile the two provi-
sions, Section 4(c) must, therefore, deal with the initial payment of 
these expenses, while Section 9 deals with the ultimate payment, i.e., 
payment if the court determines at the end of the action that the 
expenses should constitute a part of the assessable costs of the action. 
§24.10. Conclusion. 'As the foregoing review of Rule 15 indicates, 
there are many unanswered questions which will have to be resolved. 
As with all things that are new, there will be problems of interpreta-
tion and practical problems of procedure which will have to be 
settled as Massachusetts lawyers become more familiar with Rule 15. 
Pretrial oral discovery is not a panacea. However, it cannot be gainsaid 
that it is a great step forward if one is willing to accept the premise 
that the trial of a lawsuit should be a quest for truth and not an 
exercise in gamesmanship. If given a fair chance to operate by counsel 
and if accorded a liberal interpretation by the judiciary, civil trials 
in the state courts of Massachusetts will no longer be "carried on in 
the dark."l Indeed, with the use of Rule 15 "a trial [will be] less a 
game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues 
and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."2 In short, it can 
be hoped that victory will more frequently go to the party entitled to 
it, on all of the facts, instead of going to the side which may be best 
§24.l0. 1 Hiekman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 389, 91 L. Ed. 
451, 457 (1947). 
2 United States v. Procter Be Gamble Co., 356 U.s. 677, 682, 78 Sup. Ct. 9811, 
986-987, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077, 1082 (1958). 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1966 [1966], Art. 27
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1966/iss1/27
§24.10 RULE 15: PRETRIAL ORAL DISCOVERY 367 
in hiding facts or exploiting the element of surprise at the trial. The 
trial will be henceforth more of a contest between parties rather than 
attorneys, although the expertise and art of the trial lawyer will still 
playa great part in the trial of cases. 
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